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Protecting Academic and Non-Profit Research: Creating a
Compulsory Licensing Provision in the Absence of an

Experimental Use Exception

Kimberly M Thomast
Abstract
The experimental use exception permits researchers and their
institutions to make certain uses of patent inventions for purposes of
experiment or research. Unfortunately, this judicially created
doctrine is applied infrequently and is interpretednarrowly. Thus, in
most cases, researchers do not have a patent infringement defense
under which they can conduct basic research. This comment argues
that a compulsory patent licensing provision based on a reformation
of the Bayh-Dole Act may solve this problem. This comment analyzes
several economically developed foreign nations that use patent
compulsory licensing provisions as a base for the U.S.
implementation. Section H discusses the history of the U.S.
experimental use exception. Section III discusses the impact and
implications of the Madey v. Duke University decision on U.S.
research. Section IV gives the doctrinal background on the theory of
compulsory licensing, international treatment of compulsory
licensing, and the purpose of Bayh-Dole Act in the United States.
Section IV also discusses how the U.S. can utilize the ideas of other
countries to reanalyze and amend the Bayh-Dole Act to produce our
own compulsory licensing legislation in light of a non-existent
experimental use defense. Section V provides some final observations
on compulsory licensing.
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INTRODUCTION

In the United States, the common law experimental use
exception permits researchers and their institutions to make certain
uses of patent inventions for purposes of experiment or research.' The
exception is a favorable defense against a claim that the accused
researcher has infringed a valid patent. The exception is neither a part
of the patent granting process nor is it within the jurisdiction of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office.2 Instead, the exception is
under the jurisdiction of the courts whenever a patent infringement
case is before it.3 In short, one must look to commercial practice,
legislation, and past court decisions in order to understand the nature
of the exception. 4
While the courts recognize the exception to patent infringement,
this judicially created doctrine is described as very narrow and rarely
applied.5 In particular, the exception applies only for actions
performed "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry."6 Further, the exception is not applied if there
is the slightest hint of a commercial application. 7 This would also
exclude non-commercial use that is consistent with legitimate
business. 8 In short, the U.S. does not possess a 'much-needed' patent
infringement defense that researchers could utilize for conducting
basic research.
Through compulsory licensing, the government can compel a
patent holder to license the patent, allowing for production and
distribution of patented products to the public. 9 This comment argues
for a patent compulsory licensing provision, with an emphasis on

1. Tom Saunders, Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the Future of
the Experimental Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261 (2003).
2.
See Jordan P. Karp, Experimental Use as PatentInfringement: The Impropriety of a
Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169, 2169 & n.4 (1991).
3.

See id. at 2169-70.

4.
5.

See id.
Id. at 2173-74.

6.
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S.
958 (2003) (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000))

(internal quotations omitted).
7. Id. at 1362.
8. Id. The court, in its reasoning, provided that the institution's research projects,
including education and enlightening students and faculty that took part in research projects,
furthered the institution's legitimate business objectives. Id.
9.
Dora Kripapuri, Reasoned Compulsory Licensing: Applying U.S. Antitrust's "Rule of
Reason" to TRIP's Compulsory Licensing Provision, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669, 670 (2001).
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protecting academic research in the areas of public interest. Further,
this comment suggests reformation of the Bayh-Dole Act, 10 a federal
technology transfer policy, as the conduit to enact a compulsory
licensing provision. In addition, this comment will analyze several
economically developed foreign nations that use patent compulsory
licensing provisions as a base for the U.S. implementation. Section II
discusses the history of the U.S. experimental use exception. Section
III discusses the impact and implications of the Madey v. Duke
University decision on U.S. research.1 1 Section IV gives the doctrinal
background on the theory of compulsory licensing, international
treatment of compulsory licensing, and the purpose of Bayh-Dole Act
in the United States. The analysis in Section IV will evaluate the
compulsory licensing schemes and legislation that other nations have
implemented to benefit their nation's public interest. In addition, this
part of the comment will discuss how the U.S. can utilize the ideas of
other countries to reanalyze and amend the Bayh-Dole Act to produce
our own compulsory licensing legislation in light of a non-existent
experimental use defense. Section V provides some final observations
on compulsory licensing.
II. HISTORY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION IN
THE US
The experimental use defense in U.S. patent law has its origin in
an opinion written in 1813 by Justice Story. 12 In Whittemore v. Cutter,
a patent infringement case, Justice Story stated "that it could never
have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who
constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or
for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to
produce its described effects." 13 Unfortunately for academic and non-

10. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000). The Bayh-Dole Act allows recipients of federal
funds, regardless of their for-profit or non-profit status, to patent their inventions. These
patentees may then sell or grant exclusive or non-exclusive licenses, though there is a preference

for licensing to small businesses, and non-profit entities may need federal permission to fully
assign their patent rights.
11.
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Madey significantly narrowed
the experimental use exception, and is likely to significantly influence the way in which
academic scientific research is conducted. Id. at 1362.
12.
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
13.

Id. See also Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D.Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391)

("This court has.., held that the making of a patented machine to be an offence.., must be the
making with an intent to use for profit, and not for the mere purpose of philosophical

experiment, or to ascertain the verity... of the specification." (citing Whittemore, 29 F. Cas.
1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600))).
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profit researchers, the view that there is no infringement and thus, no
requirement for a license to practice the patented invention if such
experiments are for the sole purpose of philosophical inquiry, does
not carry forward to the present day. 14 Instead, if the products of the
experiment are sold or used by the researcher or if the experiments are
conducted with a view to adapting the invention for commercial
purposes, the acts of the researcher are infringing
and thus the proper
5
subject of a license from the patent owner.'
In addition, subsequent cases have limited the doctrine to very
narrow grounds. 16 In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical
Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("Federal Circuit") recognized the existence of a common law
17
experimental use exception but construed its scope very narrowly.
The court held that the use of a patented active ingredient by the
competitor to perform tests necessary to obtain approval of the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) for a generic drug did not fall within
the experimental use exception to the patent right. I8 The court
reasoned that the competitor's experimental use was "solely for
business reasons and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or
for strictly philosophical inquiry."' 19 In particular, the court stated that
the competitor could not "construe the experimental use rule so
broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of
'scientific inquiry,' when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and
2 °
non-insubstantial commercial purposes.
Thereafter, in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., the
Federal Circuit reconfirmed the restricted nature of the common law
experimental use doctrine. 2' Citing Roche, the court did not exempt
experiments that were conducted in order to design around the
patented subject matter.22 The patented subject matter related to

14.
See e.g., Richard T. Jackson, A Lockean Approach to the Compulsory Patent
Licensing Controversy, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 117, 118 (2004) (noting that potential

improvement patent inventors find it unjust to be excluded from using an improvement on an
original patent).
15.
See generally id.
16.
5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT 82, § 16.03[1] (Cum. Supp. Matthew Bender

& Co. Aug. 2005).
17.
Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
18.

Id.

19.

Id.

20.
21.

Id.
Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

22.

Id.
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"methods of inoculating birds against disease by injecting vaccines
into a specified region of the egg" before hatching.23 The court held
that the patent was infringed, as tests performed by the competitor to
investigate the possibility of injecting chicken embryos outside the
region covered by the patent were neither experimental use nor24 de
minimis, since the tests were performed for commercial purposes.
Despite the court's narrow interpretation of the experimental use
exception, academic researchers have long believed that the scope of
the experimental use exception should extend to at least
experimentation performed at universities or non-profit institutions.2 5
This belief, however, was dispelled by the Madey v. Duke University
decision.26 In Madey, The Federal Circuit held that Duke University
was not immunized from patent infringement when it used patented
research equipment for experimental purposes. 27 The decision called
for a restricted status against universities that pursued aggressive
28
patent policies and obtained substantial revenue from their patents.
The exception's restricted nature has caused researchers to fear that
they will have to redirect their attention from research activities to
expensive and time-consuming patent searches, infringement
opinions, licensing activities, and inevitable litigation - all of which
29
will cause substantial administrative and financial costs.
Furthermore, researchers are concerned that U.S. academic research
will be diverted to foreign institutions in countries with broader
experimental use exceptions.30 More importantly, the narrow reading
of the exception limits a researcher's access to state of the art
technologies and thus discourages further technological development
in the interest of the public. 3'
The basic research conducted by academic and non-profit
institutions leads to innovations and inventions, in such areas as
23.

Id. at 1346.

24.
Id. at 1349.
25.
Michelle Cai, Madey v. Duke University: Shattering the Myth of Universities'
Experimental Use Defense, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 178 (2004).
26.

(2003).
27.
28.
29.

Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958

Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1362-63 n.7.
See Cai, supra note 25, at 185.

30.
See Lawrence M. Sung & Claire M. Maisano, Piercing the Academic Veil:
Disaffecting the Common Law Exception to the Patent Infringement Liability and the Future of

a Bona Fide Research Use Exemption After Madey v. Duke University, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 256, 279 (2003) [hereinafter Sung].
31.

See id
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pharmaceuticals, health care, and biotechnology, which is an industry
that has been built almost entirely on the shoulders of academic
research.32 It has been determined that, in the U.S., universities are
33
significantly responsible for more than half of the basic research.
For example, statistics show that in 1997 universities contributed and
activity. 34
conducted 14.5% of all research and developmental
Therefore, it cannot be overlooked that researchers at universities and
non-profit institutions have played a key role in scientific
advancements that benefit the American public's safety and welfare.
As research grows increasingly complicated, it becomes
imperative that researchers must collaborate not only with each other
but also must seek legal and legislative changes to solve the
challenges that they face. 35 Therefore, many university researchers
and non-profit institutions understand that to promote their scientific
endeavors, they must now depend on access to proprietary enabling
research and technologies held by others.36 However, the Madey
decision made such transfer of knowledge more difficult through the
increase of researchers' administrative burdens.3 7 Despite this fact, it
cannot be denied that some of the "mega-universities" of the U.S. are
very much in the "business" of research and are not completely
separated from commercial enterprises. As Madey states, Duke
University, like many other major educational research institutions, is
"not shy in pursuing an aggressive licensing program from which it
derives a not insubstantial revenue stream." 38 Therefore, such savvy
profit-producing institutions' use of the patented inventions of others
leaves them vulnerable with no immunity from claims of patent
infringement. 39 However, because university researchers are less
knowledgeable in the legal analysis of infringement, many rarely
check patent databases to determine whether their innovations
40
infringed any patents issued to commercial or industrial entities.
32. See Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing GlobalHealth Inequities: An Open Licensing
Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1078 (2005).
33.

Id.

34.

Id.

35.

See Eyal H. Barash, Experimental Uses, Patents, and Scientific Progress, 91 Nw.

U.L. REV. 667, 685 (1997).
See Daniel McCurdy & Thomas Reynolds, US universities enter the real world of
36.
patents, INTELLECTUAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, Apr/May 2004 at 18, available at

http://thinkfire.com/US%20UNIVERSITIES%20ARTICLE.pdf.
37. See Cai, supra note 25, at 185.
39.

Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See Barash, supra note 35, at 698.

40.

Id.

38.
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Therefore, should universities and non-profit institutions be penalized
in their quest to conduct the basic research that is needed to continue
to keep this country safe, healthy, and flourishing?
III. THE EFFECT OF A NON-EXISTENT EXCEPTION ON
ACADEMIC AND NON-PROFIT RESEARCH IN THE U.S.
The Madey decision provoked outcries among universities and
non-profit research institutions that feared the decision would
significantly impede the nation's scientific advancement by either
limiting or totally eliminating the experimental use exception. 4' In
1998, Dr. John Madey sued Duke University, a prestigious private
university, for patent infringement of his two patents.4 2 The issue in
Madey was whether research using patented technology by the major
research university, whose legitimate business includes conducting
research, constitutes "experimental use."4 3 Duke asserted the
experimental use defense as one of its defenses to the charge, arguing
that it had set up the equipment that used Madey's two patents only to
run experiments in the University's free electron laser laboratory.44
The Federal Circuit was not persuaded by Duke's arguments and
held that "regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is
engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain," the experimental use
defense is unavailable "so long as the act is in furtherance of the
alleged infringer's legitimate business ...
Legitimate business
was defined as "educating and enlightening students and faculty
participating in ... projects, . . . increas[ing] the status of the
institution, and lur[ing] lucrative grants, students and faculty. 46 In
essence, legitimate business refers not only to commercial endeavors
in the marketplace, but also to any activity that serves an institution's
mission, even when that mission is manifestly noncommercial. 47
Therefore, in this formulation, research conducted at a research
university qualifies as legitimate business activity for which no

41.
See Elizabeth Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do
Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 921, 922 (2006).
42.

Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

43.

See id.at 1361-62.

44.

Id.at 1353.

45.

Id. at 1362.

46. Id. (stating that all research institutions "are in the business of conducting research
and development.")
47.
See Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United
States Patent Infringement Liability:
Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and
Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 944 (2004).
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infringement protection applies. The effect of the Federal Circuit

refusal to delineate and craft an appropriate judicial standard for the
experimental use exception in Madey is to restrict access to patented
research and technology, limiting the types of creative and intellectual
works that researchers can produce. 8 With virtually no immunity and

protection from unscrupulous patent infringement suits, the general
research activities aimed at creating and improving inventions at
academic and non-profit research institutions will come to a halt

unless a solution is brought to the forefront of this troublesome issue.
IV. THE NEED FOR A COMPULSORY LICENSING PROVISION
N THE U.S. FOR PUBLIC INTEREST REASONS

One does not have to reach back far in time to find a situation
that could have benefited from a public interest compulsory licensing
provision. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001 and the subsequent anthrax scares, 49 the Bush administration

48.
John R. Thomas, Scientific Research and the Experimental Use Privilege in Patent
Law, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (Oct. 28, 2004), availableat
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32651 .pdf.
49.
See Jason D. Ferrone, Compulsory Licensing During Public Health Crises:
Bioterrorism'sMark on Global PharmaceuticalPatent Protection,26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 385, 385 (2003).
On September 18, 2001, letters containing coetaneous anthrax spores
traveled through New Jersey postal facilities bound for Tom Brokaw and The
New York Post .... Once medical personnel determined that the suspect letters
contained anthrax, .... [p]ublic health officials fear[ed] a national shortage of the
antibiotic, [ciproflaxin,] in the event of a future mass exposure. The Canadian
government became so engrossed in the possibility of a mass exposure that it
hastily granted a compulsory license for ciproflaxin production to a Canadian
producer. U.S. Senator, Charles E. Schumer, ... urged the Bush Administration
that allowing the generic production of ciproflaxin was imperative to procure a
sufficient ciproflaxin stockpile for use by the American people in the event of a
widespread bioterrorism attack. Tommy Thompson, the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary, initially did not
believe he had the authority to grant Senator Schumer's request. Upon
ascertaining his legal authority to override the ciproflaxin patent, Secretary
Thompson refrained from implementing Senator Schumer's proposal.
The Secretary intended to negotiate with Bayer for a better price for
taxpayers, rather than break the ciproflaxin patent. If Bayer did not meet the price
concessions desired by the U.S. government, Secretary Thompson possessed the
power to authorize generic production of ciproflaxin under U.S. law and the
TRIPS agreement. After negotiations, Bayer granted the United States
government a significant price reduction for ciproflaxin, bringing its
governmental price from $ 1.86 per pill, to S 0.95 per pill. Faced with a public
health emergency, the United States implemented a developing country's
negotiation tactics and thereby broadened Article 31 's interpretation.
Id. at 403-05.
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considered invoking a compulsory license for an antibiotic that was
approved for treatment of the infection.5 ° While the parties were able
to reach an agreement before a compulsory licensing provision was
enacted, it should not be overlooked that it took a threat of 'megaproportion' to threaten the invocation of such legislation. Should
Congress forever be required to move quickly to enact legislation
only when a national emergency arises? It seems plausible that with
an effective compulsory licensing scheme already in place and within
the laws of the U.S., the citizens of this country would not have to
walk such a thin rope in protecting their interests.
Consequently, the U.S. needs a proactive mechanism to quickly
access enabling research and technology to grapple with public
interest matters in time-sensitive situations and emergencies. The
mechanism could be carried out in a "ready-to-go" public interest
compulsory licensing scheme enacted by Congress. The proposed
compulsory licensing scheme in the U.S. should be based on the
philosophy that researchers and scientists best conduct science." As a
result of compulsory licensing legislation, researchers are given the
benefit of the doubt as they determine when experimentation begins
and ends.52 Therefore, society encourages innovation and protects
what is most important, America's well being.
The idea of infringing a patent and enacting compulsory
licensing for the public's interest is not a far-fetched idea in the U.S.
For example, in City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated an order enjoining the
infringement of a patent where the result would have created a threat
to public health.53 In Activated Sludge the inventor of an apparatus for
treating raw sewage by aeration sued the City of Milwaukee for
patent infringement. 54 Although the court agreed that the patent had
been infringed upon, it believed that enjoining the city from using the
patent would have led to closing of the sewage plant and would have
50.

Compulsory license bill introducedin the US House of Representatives,

http://promotetheprogress.com/archives/2005/1 0/compulsorylice.html (Oct. 28, 2005).
51. See Kapczynski, supra note 32, at 1078 (arguing that universities have the "power to
act to improve the lives of patients and also to collectively persuade [the] private sector. . . of
the need for an open licensing approach.").
52.
Aaron Miller, Repairing the Bayh-Dole Act: A Proposalfor Restoring Non-Profit
Access to University Science, 2005 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 093001 (Sept. 30, 2005),
available at http:/ibciptf.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=18&ltemid=30.

Similarly, some have suggested a waiver system, which "would provide certainty for researchers
who would have an actual government permit .... Id.
53. City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934).
54. See id. at 579, 593.
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forced the city to dump raw sewage into Lake Michigan, resulting in
pollution and a public health risk.55 Thus Activated Sludge serves as
an excellent example where a purported patent infringer was granted
immunity because of the public interest.
Furthermore, certain statutes have also allowed for compulsory
licensing of a patentee's invention.56 For instance, Congress has
enacted the Clear Air Act and the Atomic Energy Act, both of which
provides for compulsory licensing of patented inventions.5 7 Both acts
justify compulsory licensing on the basis that it is in the public's best
interest to require the use of another's patented invention.58
It is also not far-fetched to think that compulsory licensing might
provide the best option to enable institutions to further research
advancements for the public's interest 59 because they "further the
same goal [as] general patent laws[] [by] creating an incentive for
new technologies., 60 A basic assumption underlying most patent
systems is that society is benefited more by the advancing innovation
61
than it is harmed by the grant of"a monopoly to the inventor.,
Despite the fact that compulsory licensing could guarantee that
the public will receive the intended benefits that are the basis for
U.S.' Patent Laws, both the U.S. courts and commentators "frequently
express pro-patent sentiments hostile to the very concept of
compulsory licensing. 62 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long
upheld the right of the patentee to prohibit others from using his
invention, although the patentee might not be utilizing the invention.6 3
While, some U.S. courts have suggested that public interest could
provide a basis for forcing the patentee to relinquish some of his
rights and license the invention, such courts have still declined to take

55.

Id. at 593.

56. Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to
Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 445 (2002).

57. Id. at 445-46.
58. Id. at 446.
59. See Ruth E. Freeburg, No Safe Harbor and No Experimental Use: Is it Time for
Compulsory Licensing ofBiotech Tools?, 53 BUFF. L. REv. 351, 359 (2005).
60. Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 666, 667-68 (1988).

61.
Id. at 668.
62. U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. and Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev. [UNCTADICTSD], Project on Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development, Non-voluntary
Licensing of PatentedInventions (June 2003) (preparedby Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine
Hasenzahl) [hereinafter Reichman], available at
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/CSreichman hasenzahl.pdf.
63. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432-33 (1945).
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this path.64 Moreover, the U.S. has never adopted a general statute to
regulate compulsory licensing of patent
inventions in the area of
65
public interest and public emergencies.
Specifically, compulsory licensing has been opposed on the
grounds that it would diminish the purpose of the patent system by
reducing inventors' incentive to develop new technologies by
encouraging inventors to keeps inventions secret.66 However, most
systems give patentees a minimum three-to-four year time period to
exploit their invention before compulsory licensing may be granted.6 7
Therefore, the inventor would have sufficient time to determine if the
invention is worth pursuing, giving him a head start over his
competitors in bringing the product to market.68 In addition, if the
invention is pursued, the inventor is entitled to reasonable royalties
from the licensee.69 Compulsory licensing, in this light, would not
discourage investment
in innovation or encourage inventors to keep
70
secret.
a
works
their
Another argument against compulsory licensing is that it reduces
product competition. 71 However, this would only be a concern if
compulsory licensing were granted very liberally. Under the normal
compulsory licensing schemes, licenses are not granted frequently so
that a prospective inventor would be better off just trying to develop a
better product than trying to obtain the patent.72 In opposition to the
arguments against compulsory licensing, the competition between
companies and inventors would lead to increased competition and
better development and innovation of new products.
Critics of compulsory licensing also argue that even countries
with provisions for licensing rarely grant actual compulsory
licenses.7 3 However, this argument "ignores [the] cases where the
possibility of a compulsory license encourages the parties to come to
64.
Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensingfor Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1281 (2001).
65. Id.at 1278.
66.
See Leroy Whitaker, Compulsory Licensing-Another Nail in the Coffin, 2 AM. PAT.
L. ASS'N Q.J. 155, 167-68 (1974).
67.

Fauver, supra note 60, at 676.

68.

Id.

69.
See id at 677.
70.
EDITH PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 78 (The
Johns Hopkins Press 1951).
71.

Whitaker, supra note 66, at 165.

72.

ld.

73.
See C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT
SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 16 (Cambridge at the University Press 1973).

358

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J.

[Vol. 23

alternative to
an agreement [between] themselves as a[n] ...
litigation." 74 In the U.S. alone, there have been several reported
instances where inventors threatened with compulsory licensing have
been unable to come to an agreement with the patent holders and
avoid costly litigation.7 5
Moreover, the lack of a compulsory licensing provision for
public interest in the U.S. is not based on a lack of effort to enact such
legislation. There have been many proposals to amend the U.S. patent
laws so that they would require compulsory licensing under particular
circumstances. 76 For instance, H.R. 2927 was submitted to the 106th
Congress "to provide for compulsory licensing of certain patented
inventions relating to health. 77 In 2001, another bill was presented to
the 107th Congress that would give the Secretary of Health and
Human Services broad discretion to issue compulsory licenses to
address public health emergencies. 78 In 2005, Congressman Sherrod
Brown urged that compulsory licensing legislation be enacted to deal
with the growing need for essential medicines in the event of a public
emergency.7 9 More to the point, Congressman Brown's proposed
legislation was created to deal with major obstacles in the flu
pandemic and the insufficient production of anti-virals and antibiotics
to combat the illness. 80
Despite both the need and promise of such legislation, Congress
has staunchly resisted passing any of these proposals due to strident
opposition by patentees and industry interests. 81 While Congressman
Brown's proposal and those of others before him have been based on
sound principles, most of the proposals have only dealt with
82
emergency situations or expediting access to emergency medicines.
Therefore, to strike a balance between the rights of inventors and the

74.

Yosick, supra note 64, at 1294.

75.

Id.

Id. at 1278.
77.
Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, H.R. 2927, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999). This bill
was introduced in the House of Representatives on September 23, 1999.
76.

78.

Public Health Emergency Medicines Act, H.R. 3235, 107th Cong. (lst Sess. 2001).

This bill was introduced by Congressman Brown of Ohio on November 6, 2001 and would give
the Secretary of Health and Human Services broad discretion to issue compulsory licenses to
address public health emergencies.
79. See posting of James Love, james.love@cptech.org, to ip-health@lists.essential.org,
available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2005-November/008638.html

2005) (last visited Nov. 26, 2006).
80.

See id.

81.

Yosick, supra note 64, at 1278.

82.

See e.g., James Love, supra note 79.

(Nov. 8,
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needs of academia, the mechanism of compulsory licensing and a
broader view similar to Mr. Brown's and others, which deals with not
only public emergencies but with public interest issues as a whole,
should be implemented.
A. History ofInternationalTreatment of Patent Compulsory
Licensing
In 1873, the Vienna Congress took place, and was the first
international convention on patents.83 Cases that required compulsory
licensing for public interest issues were discussed and adopted.84
Although accepted, this was not a popular resolution. 85 Article 31 of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPs") specifically referred to various grounds for the
granting of compulsory licenses to be determined by each member
country. 8 6 These justifications include (1) national emergency or
extreme urgency; (2) anti-competitive practices; (3) public noncommercial use; (4) dependent patents; and (5) medicine. 87 In
particular, Japan and Germany allow compulsory licensing provisions
for public interest reasons. 88
The text of TRIPs Article 31(b) indirectly vindicates public
interest as a separate ground for compulsory licensing and leaves
considerable leeway to impose such licensing of patented inventions
for any legitimate purpose and without undue constraints.8 9 It should
83.
Kripapuri, supranote 9, at 674.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Carlos Correa, Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in
Developing Countries 97 (South Centre 2000), available at
http://www.idlo.int/textsfIDLO/mis3649.pdf [hereinafter Integrating Public Health Concerns].
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Part II, sec. 5, art. 31,
(Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 81, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPs].
87. Jennifer Bjomberg, Brazil's Recent Threat on Abbott's Patent: Resolution or
Retaliation?,27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 199, 203 (2006).
88. Jackson, supranote 14, at 121.
89. See TRIPs, supranote 86, Part II, sec. 5, art. 3 1(b):
such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial
terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a
reasonable period of time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in the
case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in
cases of public non-commercial use. In situations of national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified
as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-commercial use,
where the government or contractor, without making a patent search, knows or

360

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 23

be noted that the flexibility embedded in Article 31 is not boundless,
and other provisions in TRIPs may further constrain it. 90 For example,
one must be cautious when attempting to work around the nondiscrimination requirement in Article 27(1). 9' This article of the
Agreement stipulates that patent rights shall be "enjoyable without
discrimination.., whether the products are imported or locally
produced. 'g Though Article 27(1) has been understood as prohibiting
national laws from imposing an obligation to execute locally a
patented invention, this interpretation is not unanimous and its
interpretation is debatable.93 Nevertheless, Article 27 provides
exceptions for use in instances where Members wish to protect public
order and morality, including the protection of human life.94
In the U.S, proponents of compulsory licensing point to foreign
patent policy, which grants freedom to use the patented inventions of
another for research or educational needs.9 5 Further, the patent
systems of foreign nations have created a number of doctrines to
maintain a reasonable balance between the rights of patent holders
and innovative research developments while adhering to the
requirements of TRIPs. 96 Likewise, the U.S. can establish a
compulsory licensing provision in the name of public interest based
has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for
the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly.
90. Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPs Agreement:
Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941, 961 (2000).
91.

Reichman, supra note 62:

1.Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article

70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights
enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.
See TRIPS, supra note 86, Part It,
sec. 5, art. 27(1).
92.

TRIPS, supra note 86, Part II, sec. 5, art. 27(1).

93.
See e.g., Nari Lee, Patent Eligible Subject Matter Reconfiguration and the
Emergence of ProprietarianNorms - The Patent Eligibility of Business Methods, 45 IDEA
321, 339-40 (2005).
94.

See TRIPs, supra note 86, Part II, sec. 5, art. 27(2):

2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect
ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or
health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such

95.

exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.
See Sung, supranote 30, at 280-81.

96.
See Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements
and Compulsory Licenses at InternationalLaw, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243, 269 (1997).
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and statutory law and
on well-established foreign judicial precedent
97
Agreement.
TRIPs
the
with
that is consistent
B. Compulsory Licensingfor Public Interest in Japan
Japanese patent law provides for a limitation on the patent
holder's rights for the purposes of experiment or research. 98
Proponents of implementing a compulsory licensing scheme in the
U.S. maintain that such a scheme has not significantly diminished
scientific innovation.9 9 In 1899, Japan enacted the Patent Law, the
the version, Law No. 121,
Design Law and the Trademark Law with
00
country.1
that
in
force
in
currently
159,
The essence of both the U.S. and Japanese patent system can be
found in the expression of their objectives. The Japanese patent law
system expressly emphasizes industrial development as the ultimate
objective of patent protection.' 0 ' While on the other hand, the U.S.
stresses its role as a promoter of the useful arts and does not expressly
emphasize industrial development. 10 2 Nevertheless, the objectives of
U.S. and Japanese patent laws of Japan and the U.S. are quite similar.
The objective of Japanese patent law is "to encourage inventions by
promoting their protection and utilization and thereby to contribute to
the development of industry."' 0 3 Similarly, the objective of U.S.
patent law is to "[to] promote the progress of ... the useful arts, by
to
securing for limited '' times
4
their ... discoveries. 0

. .

. inventors the exclusive right to

The Japanese Patent Act allows the granting of compulsory
licenses for implementing dependent, related inventions and for the
use of inventions that have not been used for an extended period of
time. 1 5 More importantly for researchers, compulsory licenses are
97.

Id. at 268-69.

Shoichi Okuyama, PatentInfringementLitigation in Japan, Dec. 1997,
http://www.okuyama.com/liti.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2007).
See generally Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the
99.
Compulsory Licensing of PharmaceuticalsHurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 853
98.

(2003).
Masaaki Kotabe, A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Patent Systems, 23 J.
100.
INT'L BUS. STUDIES 147 (1992).
See id. at 150.
101.
102.

See id.

103. Tokkyoh6 [Patent Act], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 1, available at
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/PA_2.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2007) [hereinafter
Japanese Patent Act].
104.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

105.

Kotabe, supra note 100, at 154.
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106
granted on patented inventions in the interest of the general public.
Article 93 of the Japanese Patent Act, entitled "Award granting nonexclusive license forpublic interest," states:

(1) Where the working of a patented invention is particularly
necessary in the public interest, a person who intends to work the
invention may request the patentee or the exclusive licensee to
hold consultations on the grant of a non-exclusive license.
(2) If no agreement is reached or no consultation is possible under
the preceding subsection, a person who intends to work the
for International Trade
patented invention may request the Minister
1 07
and Industry for an arbitration decision.
The prevalence of compulsory licensing in Japan, a major
industrial country, indicates that the country finds compulsory
licensing not only beneficial but as a necessary part of their patent
laws. Following Japan's lead, the U.S. should enact compulsory
licensing for public interest reasons as well.
C. Compulsory Licensingfor PublicInterest in Brazil
Brazil's new law for patents, the Industrial Property Law, was
promulgated on May 15, 1997.1°8 Under the Industrial Property Law
the Brazilian National Institute of Industrial Property can
impose a compulsory license when requested by a third party if:
the patent holder exercises [their] right in an abusive manner, the
requestor has a legitimate interest in a license, the requestor is
technically and economically able to practice the license, and the
products produced0 9under the license are earmarked mainly for the
Brazilian market. 1
However, some laws refer more broadly to public health. For
instance, Brazilian Decree 3201/99 established that where the Federal
Executive Authorities determines a case involves a national
emergency or public interest, a temporary ex officio nonexclusive
compulsory license can be granted. 110 In Brazil, public interest
includes "public health protection satisfying nutritional requirements,
protection of the environment and other areas of fundamental
106.

Japanese Patent Act, supra note 103, art. 93.

107.

Id. (emphasis added).

108.

Ladas & Parry LLP, Brazil - New IndustrialPropertyLaw, Aug. 1996,

http://www.ladas.comi/BULLETINS/1996/0896Bulletin/Brazill.0896.html

2007).
109.

2-9 BAXTER, WORLD PATENT LAW & PRACTICE § 9.01 (2006).

110.

Correa, supra note 86, at 96 (emphasis added).

(last visited Jan. 28,
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importance to the technological or social and economic development
of Brazil." ' Section III of the Brazil Patent Laws deals with
compulsory licenses." 2 The pertinent section is as follows:
71. In cases of national emergency or of public interest, declared in
a decision of the Federal Executive Power, and where the patent
owner or his licensee do not satisfy such need, a temporary nonexclusive compulsory license to exploit the patent may be granted
ex officio,
3 without prejudice to the rights of the owner of the
patent. '1

Brazil provides patented drugs free of charge to its citizens for
its HIV/AIDS prevention program. 1 4 In efforts to deal with its
struggle against AIDS, Brazil threatened to grant a compulsory
licensing for various patented AIDS drugs by implementing the
safeguards set forth in TRIPs and in accordance with their national
legislation.1 1 5 After a brief negotiation period with executives of the
pharmaceutical company, Roche, Brazil's Minister of Health
announced that he planned to break the patent on the AIDS drug,
nelfinavir." 6 To authorize the grant of a compulsory license to
produce nelfinavir, the Minister would have invoked Article 71's
"natural emergency" provision in accordance with Article 31 of the
TRIPs agreement.' 17 This situation made Brazil the first World Trade
Organization country to use Article 31 for compulsory licensing on a
patented drug." 8 Although the number of persons infected with AIDS
in developing countries is rising in epidemic proportions, the United
States still opposes the granting of compulsory licenses by developing
countries." 9 While this comment does not propose that compulsory
licensing should be enacted to deal specifically with the AIDS
epidemic, the U.S. must reaffirm its commitment to utilize all efforts
and resources to guarantee the quality of universal public health,
safety, and welfare. Enacting a public interest compulsory licensing
provision could effectively carry out such a public policy.

111.

ld.

112.

See Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, D.O., 15/05/1996 (93,

1): 8353,

15.05.1996, translatedin World Intellectual Property Organization, Law No. 9,279, of May 14,
1996, http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs new/pdf/en/br/brOO3en.pdf.
113. Id. at art. 71.
114. Ferrone, supra note 49, at 401.
115.

Id.

116.
117.
118.

Id. at 402.
Id. at403.
Id. at402.

119.

Id. at 400-01.
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Compulsory Licensingfor Public Interest in Germany

Section 24(1) of the German Patent Act provides for compulsory
licensing for public interest:
A non-exclusive authorization to commercially exploit an
invention shall be granted by the Patent Court ... in accordance
with the following provisions (compulsory license) if
1. the applicant for a license has unsuccessfully endeavored during
a reasonable period of time to obtain from the patentee consent to
exploit the invention under reasonable conditions usual in trade;
and
120
2. public interest commands the grant of a compulsory license.

This provision relates to the requirement of public interest in
order to implement legislation. Therefore, a court will only grant a
that the working of the
compulsory license if a plaintiff can prove
12 1
defendant's patent is in the public interest.
Using Section 24(1), a German Federal Patent Court in 1991
granted a compulsory license in favor of a German firm with respect
to a patent held by a U.S. firm. 122 The purpose of the license was to
allow the marketing of a therapeutic application of interferon that had
the
been
developed by the German firm. 123 However,
Bundesgerichtshof of December 5, 1995 [Case No. X ZR 26/92]
revoked the license. 124 This revocation was not based on the fact that
a compulsory license was granted based on public interest but in this
specific case, on a lack of sufficient "public interest" in the present
context and the particular facts of the case. 125 In other words, a
German court will not grant a compulsory license in order to redress
the private interest conflict between the parties, but if exploitation of

120.

Patentgesetz [German Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BGBI. I at 1981,

§

24(1) (F.R.G.),

translatedin World Intellectual Property Organization, PatentLaw,

http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs-new/pdf/en/de/de08 1en.pdf (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122.
Michael Kern, Recent Federal Supreme Court decisions on Experiment Use and
Compulsory Licensing, 3 CASRIP NEWSLETTER, (IssuE 2) (Summer 1996), availableat

http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Newsletter/Vol3/newsv3i2eu.html.
123.

See id.

124.
Int'l Chamber of Commerce/Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n [ICC/AIPLA] Joint
Conference, The Future of TRIPs: Impact of the Doha Public Health Declaration, Compulsory
Licensing in Europe (Sept. 2002) (preparedby David Perkins & Clifford Chance), available at
http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Meetings-andEvents 1/InternationalSymposia 1/
perkins.pdf.
125.

See id.
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the invention is in the public interest, then a German court may
consider granting a compulsory license. A broad interpretation of the
experimental use exception to allow researchers in the U.S. to
continue their vital work is unlikely to come to realization. If the U.S.
were faced with a problem such as the German court, a more
preferable solution should encompass following international trends
by enacting compulsory licensing provisions for the public's interest.
E. The Bayh-Dole Act
Since attempts to create a patent compulsory licensing scheme in
the past have failed, a better approach might be to use examples of
public interest compulsory licensing provisions in foreign countries.
Taking ideas from the foreign provisions, Congress could expound on
existing U.S. legislation, preferably the Bayh-Dole Act, to create a
compulsory licensing scheme to aid universities and non-profit
institutions in their quest to benefit the public's interest and wellbeing. In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act to increase the
cooperation amongst academia, federal laboratories, and commercial
industry. 126 The Act establishes a uniform governmental patent policy
and allows small businesses recipients, nonprofit organizations, and
universities to retain title to federally funded inventions and to work
with companies in bringing them to market. 12 7 On the academia side,
the Act promotes technology transfer by creating incentives for
university researchers to consider the practical applications of their
discoveries, and for universities to search out potential companies to
develop them.1 28 Conversely, the Act enables corporations to
negotiate exclusive licensing agreements of promising technologies,
which encourages them to invest in the additional research,
development, and manufacturing capabilities needed to bring new
products to market.' 29 In addition, the Bayh-Dole Act ensures that the
Government can obtain sufficient rights in federally supported
inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect the public
against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions.' 30 This is a right the
126.
Tamsen Valoir, Government FundedInventions: The Bayh-Dole Act and the Hopkins
v. CellPro March-in Rights Controversy, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211,213 (2000).
127.
Terry K. Tullis, Application of the Government License Defense to FederallyFunded
Nanotechnology Research: The Case for a Limited Patent Compulsory Licensing Regime, 53
UCLA L. REV. 279, 304 (2005).
128.
129.

See id.

Id.
130.
See Lorelei Ritchie De Larena, What Copyright Teaches Patent Law About "Fair
Use" and Why UniversitiesAre Ignoringthe Lesson, 84 OR. L. REV. 779, 815 (2005).
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Government has in exchange of the rights bestowed upon universities
and small business entities. This enables the Government to exercise
35 U.S.C. § 203 (2000) march-in rights against the recipients of the
federal grants and contracts and compel the licensing of inventions
developed with such federal assistance. 131 This132 restriction of the
Bayh-Dole Act is a type of compulsory licensing.
While it is clear that the federal government has the use of the
inventions of a research applicant, it is possible for commercial
innovators to also try and influence the government to march-in and
require the universities or non-profit institutions to grant a reasonable
license to their private firms. 133 Thus, what is a researcher to do when
they have spent a substantial amount of time, effort, and energy in
conducting basic research and creating innovative inventions, only to
have an outside commercial entity use those inventions so freely? It is
no secret that a significant portion of scientific innovation occurs in
university and non-profit environments where patents issued to such
entities might not be used as often when compared to a private
industry.' 34 Further, many academic researchers have products with
commercial purposes.1 35 If no patent protection is available, "free
riders" may easily copy inventions without investing the time and
money needed to perform the basic research and development
undercutting the academic researcher
necessary for the invention, thus
136
who made such an investment.

131. Tullis, supra note 127, at 305. The government's march-in rights to grant a license to
one in the private section are deemed necessary under the following circumstances:
(1) action is necessary because the contractor or assignee has not taken, or is not
expected to take within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical
application of the subject invention in such field of use;
(2) action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not
reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their licensees;
(3) action is necessary to meet requirements for public use specified by Federal
regulations and such requirements are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor,
assignee, or licensees; or
(4) action is necessary because the agreement required by section 204 has not
been obtained or waived or because a licensee of the exclusive right to use or sell
any subject invention in the United States is in breach of its agreement obtained
pursuant to section 204.
35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2000).
132. Valoir, supranote 126, at 213.
133.

Seeid. n. 1l.

134.
135.
136.

See Barash, supra note 35, at 667-69.
Id. at695.
Thomas, supra note 48.
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While the need of a compulsory licensing provision is inherent
for public interest reasons, it is also desired to deal with those who
have utilized the research of universities and non-profit institutions
but are reluctant to return the favor. In short, when in need of basic
patented research, these same institutions are often frustrated to find
that they are cut off from accessing the inventions of others, who may
have a right under § 203 to freely access their work. As an example of
the limited access that researchers have to others' inventions,
academic scientists conducting agricultural research have reported
access problems to important biotechnology patented inventions. 37 It
appears that the industrial owners of the patents refuse to grant
licenses to the scientists "because they mistrust licensees or wish to
retain a field of research for themselves.' 38 This should be a quid pro
quo situation in favor of allowing a university researcher to also
request the use of another's patented invention if, on the behalf of
public interest, the patentee refuses to make the invention available on
a reasonable basis. Nevertheless, fairness calls for public access to the
patented basic research and inventions, funded with mostly
government funds, of universities and other non-profit institutions.
Therefore, it is imperative for the government to quickly develop a
balanced compulsory licensing scheme for the researcher who may
utilization and benefit from another's research and invention in their
quest to make a scientific breakthrough.
F. ProposedPatentCompulsory Licensing Provisionin the
U.S.
Congress can make amends for a lack of an experimental use
defense and relieve the restrictions on researchers. An amended BayhDole Act that implements a compulsory licensing provision would
apply to university patentees as defined by the Act: researchers who,
through concurrent funding by the government, are conducting
research "on behalf of the United States.' 39 Further, the amended Act
would also apply to commercial entities that have taken advantage of
the university patentees' work in the past and who possess patented
inventions that could potentially benefit public interest. After the
correct parties have been identified, the government must determine
whether the university or small business request for the patented

137.

Tullis, supra note 127, at 289.

138.

Id.

139.
Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and
African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 392-93 (2004).
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invention is to alleviate a public health/safety need or action is
requested to meet the requirement of public use. As an alternative, the
government can also determine whether the request meets the
requirements for public use mandated by federal regulation. If any of
these factors are established, the federal government could require the
commercial patentee to license the invention to the institution.
The amendment would allow researchers, whose works were or
are currently licensed to industrial and commercial entities, to receive
in return the opportunity to use the patented inventions of those exact
same commercial entities that have likewise benefited from the
university's research and developments. In short, the new compulsory
scheme would allow recipients of federally funds to use and
implement the patented inventions of others when their work is used
for basic research for public interest reasons and not to commercialize
an end product. The prerequisite of public interest that must be shown
should be as follows:
When it is required or necessary for public interest, a recipient of
federal funds under the Bayh-Dole Act, who intends to use, work,
or exploit the patent of an entity who has benefited from
recipient's work, may obtain a compulsory license to do so and
may without prejudice to the rights of the patent owner.
It will be in the best interest to allow the courts and other proper
administrative agencies to evaluate whether the needed requisite of
public interest is present if litigation arises. Nevertheless, the term
must be carefully guarded and capable of changing as the economic
and social climate of the time requires. Based on the TRIPs
Agreement and the legislations of other countries in compliance with
TRIPs, public interest should encompass the following: (1) to protect
public health and nutrition; (2) to promote the public interest in
sectors of vital importance (such as emergency, anti-competitive
practices, and governmental use; (3) to prevent abuse of intellectual
property rights; (4) to promote technological innovation; (5) to
promote the improvement in the balance of trade or in industrial
employment; and (6) to promote the safety and rationalization of
industrial production.
Once the term "public interest" has been defined, the
government can then balance the patentee's exclusive right against
the public interest in an effort to rid refusal to license and promote the
use of essential resources. Further, academic and non-profit scientists
must give adequate notice of such use of another's inventions as to
curb the worries of a commercial entity who believes the new
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compulsory licensing provision would give their competitors an
advantage. Lastly, a patent holder will still have the opportunity and
right to object when unfair and unjust circumstances necessitate the
need not to grant the compulsory license. This comment does not
overlook the fact that some researchers may profit from the hard work
of another patentee. In that instance, a university researcher who
develops a patent and issues it into commerce should pay a reasonable
royalty or some form of compensation to the owners of the patent in
taking their inventions. However, if the use of the researcher's
inventions was used in the course of research designed as
noncommercial in nature and for public interest, then the compulsory
license shall be granted.
V. CONCLUSION
The Bayh-Dole Act explains that Congress' purpose of the
enacted the statute was to "promote free competition and enterprise
without unduly encumbering future research and discovery."'' 40 By
enacting a compulsory licensing provision built on the common
provisions of other countries in compliance with TRIPs and the BayhDole principles, the burden on future research is reduced, the private
sector is adequately protected, and the gap left open by the nonexistent experimental use exception is filled. While the courts and
Congress have generally refuse to recognized compulsory licensing
for scientific and academia interests, the usefulness and convenience
of a compulsory licensing calls for enactment of a public interest
provision.
Universities and other non-profit organizations disseminate
knowledge in different forums and generally for a variety of public
interest reasons. Therefore, U.S. patent law should reflect those
concerns in order to ensure that these institutions will continue to
serve the public good through their research efforts. Many academics
are indeed willing to trade patenting opportunities for access to
technology due to the fact that they are usually more interested 14in1
publishing rather than patenting their research and developments.
Further, the desired patented technology is filled with useful scientific
information and discoveries, which makes its availability essential to

140.
35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000).
141.
Joseph Mohr, Unshackle Academia and Allow it to Exemplify the Purpose of Patent
Law: "To Promote the Progressof Science and the Useful Art", 88 MARQ. L. REV. 671, 678-79

(2004) (stating that many universities pressure their researchers to work on industry sponsored
projects rather than pursuing their own academic or intellectual projects).

370

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J.

[Vol. 23

expanding scientific thresholds. In essence, to continue to maintain
high scientific standards and contribute to the progress of science, the
laws of the U.S. should reflect the important scientific contributions
made by academic and non-profit researchers. By ensuring returns on
public investments in science that university and non-profit
institutions have contributed, such institutions are free from patent
infringement and the constitutional mandate to promote the progress
of science will be fulfilled.

